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Abstract
This paper is the answer to the paper by Kastner [ Found. Phys. to be published,
quant-ph/9807037] in which she continued the criticism of the counterfactual usage
of the Aharonov-Bergman-Lebowitz rule in the framework of the time-symmetrized
quantum theory, in particular, by analyzing the three-box “paradox”. It is argued
that the criticism is not sound. Paradoxical features of the three-box example has
been explained. It is explained that the elements of reality in the framework of
time-symmetrized quantum theory are counterfactual statements and, therefore,
even conflicting elements of reality can be associated with a single particle. It is
shown how such “counterfactual” elements of reality can be useful in the analysis
of a physical experiment (the three-box example). The validity of Kastner’s appli-
cation of the consistent histories approach to the time-symmetrized counterfactuals
is questioned.
1 Elements of Reality
Quantum theory teaches us that the concepts of “reality” developed on the basis of
the classical physics are not adequate for describing our world. A new language with
concepts which are appropriate is not developed yet and this is probably the root of
numerous controversies regarding interpretation of quantum formalism. It seems to me
that philosophers of science can make a real contribution for progress of quantum theory
through developing of an appropriate language. A necessary condition for a success of this
wisdom is that physicists and philosophers will try to understand each other. I hope, that
the resolution of the current controversy about the time-symmetrized quantum theory
(TSQT) will contribute to such understanding.
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I took part in the development of the TSQT [1, 2, 3] and I believe that this is an
important and useful formalism. It already helped us to find several peculiar quantum
phenomena tested in laboratories in the world [4, 5]. In the framework of the TSQT I
have used terms such as “elements of reality” [6, 7] in a sense which seems to be radically
different from the concept of reality considered by philosophers and, apparently, this is
the main reason for the current controversy.
I define that there is an element of reality at time t for an observable C, “C = c” when
it can be inferred with certainty that the result of a measurement of C, if performed, is
c. Frequently, in such a situation it is said that the observable C has the value c. It is
important to stress that both expressions do not assume “ontological” meaning for c, the
meaning according to which the system has some (hidden) variable with the value c. I do
not try to restore realistic picture of classical theory: in quantum theory observables do
not possess values. The only meaning of the expressions: “the element of reality C = c”
and “C has the value c” is the operational meaning: it is known with certainty that if C
is measured at time t, then the result is c.
Clearly, my concept of elements of reality has its roots in “elements of reality” from
the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper (EPR) [8]. There are numerous works analyzing
the EPR elements of reality. My impression that EPR were looking for an ontological
concept and their “criteria for elements of reality” is just a property of this concept. I
had no intention to define such ontological concept. I apologize for taking this name and
using it in a very different sense, thus, apparently, misleading many readers. I hope to
clarify my intentions here and I welcome suggestions for alternative name for my concept
which will avoid the confusion.
I consider elements of reality as counterfactual statements. Even if at time t the
system undergoes an interaction with a measuring device which measures C, the truth
of “C = c” is ensured not by the final reading of the pointer of this measurement, but
by a counterfactual statement that if another measurement, with as short duration as we
want, is performed at time t, it invariably reads C = c.
2 The three-box example
The actual story:
(i) A macroscopic number N of particles (gas) were all prepared at t1 in a superposition
of being in three separated boxes:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉), (1)
with obvious notation: |A〉 is the state of a particle in box A, etc.
(ii) At later time t2 all the particles were found in another superposition (this is
extremely rare event):
|ψ2〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉). (2)
(iii) In between, at time t, weak measurements of a number of particles in each box,
which are, essentially, usual measurements of pressure in each box, have been performed.
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The readings of the measuring devices for the pressure in the boxes A, B and C were
pA = p,
pB = p, (3)
pC = −p,
where p is the pressure which is expected to be in a box with N particles.
I am pretty certain that this “actual” story never took place because the probability
for successful post-selection (ii) is of the order of 3−N ; for a macroscopic number N it is
too small for any real chance to see it happens. However, given that the post-selection
(ii) does happen, I am safe to claim that (iii) is correct, i.e., the measurements of pressure
at the intermediate time with very high probability yielded the results (3).
The description of this example in the framework of the time symmetrized quantum
formalism is as follows. Each particle at time t is described by the two-state vector
〈ψ2| |ψ1〉 = 1
3
(〈A|+ 〈B| − 〈C|) (|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉), (4)
The system of all particles (signified by index i) is described by the two-state vector
〈Ψ2| |Ψ1〉 = 1
3N
i=N∏
i=1
(〈A|i + 〈B|i − 〈C|i)
i=N∏
i=1
(|A〉i + |B〉i + |C〉i) (5)
The ABL formula for the probabilities of the results of the intermediate measurements
yields, for each particle,
PA = 1,
PB = 1, (6)
PA +PB +PC = 1.
Or, using my definition, for each particle there are three elements of reality: the particle
is inside box A, the particle is inside box B, the particle is inside boxes A, B and C.
A theorem in the TSQT (Ref. [3], p. 2325) says that a weak measurement, in a
situation in which the result of a usual (strong) measurement is known with certainty,
yields the same result. Thus, from (6) it follows:
(PA)w = 1,
(PB)w = 1, (7)
(PA +PB +PC)w = 1.
Since for any variables, (X + Y )w = Xw + Yw we can deduce that (PC)w = −1.
Similarly, for the “number operators” such as NA ≡ Σi=Ni=1 P(i)A , where P(i)A is the pro-
jection operator on the box A for a particle i, we obtain:
(NA)w = N,
(NB)w = N, (8)
(NC)w = −N,
3
In this rare situation the “weak measurement” need not be very weak: a usual mea-
surement of pressure is a weak measurement of the number operator. Thus, the time-
symmetrized formalism yields surprising result (3): the pressure measurement in box C
is negative! Its value equals minus the pressure measured in the boxes A and B.
The analysis of “elements of reality” in this example which are clearly counterfactual
statements (in actual world the measurements, results of which are quoted in (6), have
not been performed) yields a tangible fruit: a shortcut for calculation of the expected
outcome of an actual measurement.1 This outcome is surprising and paradoxical. Indeed,
a usual device for measuring an observable which has only positive eigenvalues yields a
negative value, the weak value in this rare pre- and post-selected situation.
There are other paradoxical aspects discussed in relation to this example. The first
paradoxical issue which was discussed [11] reminds contextuality. Consider an observable
X which tells us the location of the particle: is it in box A, B, or C. The eigenstate of
this observable corresponding to finding the particle in A is identical to the eigenstate of
the projection operator on A: |X = A〉 = |PA = 1〉. However, in this example there is
no elements of reality X = A (if we measure X by opening all boxes at time t we have
only the probability 1/3 to find the particle inside box A) in spite of the fact that PA = 1
is an element of reality. Finally, the paradoxical aspect of the three-box example which
was analyzed by Kastner I shall analyze in the next section.
3 Kastner’s analysis of the three-box example.
In the three-box example there are two elements of reality for the same particle: “the
particle is inside box A”, and “the particle is inside box B”. Kastner [12] considers this
situation as a paradox which she resolves by rejecting the legitimacy of my concept of
elements of reality. She does not mention at all my resolution of the “paradox”. Elements
of reality are counterfactual statements. To be more explicit, “the particle is inside box
A” means that if the particle is searched in box A (and if it is not searched in box B!)
then it is certain that the particle would be found in box A. Obviously, the two elements
of reality cannot be considered together. Each element of reality assumes that antecedent
of the counterfactual statement, which is the other element of reality, is false. Thus, both
elements of reality exist separately, but we should not conclude from this that there is
an element of reality consisting of the union of the elements of reality: the antecedent
“the particle is searched in A and it is not searched in B and the particle is searched
in B and it is not searched in A” is logically inconsistent. The fact that we cannot
consider the union of elements of reality does not make the whole exercise empty. We still
can consider consequences of all true elements of reality together. In particular, in the
three-box example the consequences of elements of reality (6) are the statements about
weak values (7) and weak measurements which yield these weak values can be performed
together.
Kastner finds elements of reality “the particle is inside box A”, and “the particle is
1This example answers the criticism of Mermin [9] quoted by Kastner [10] in the context of my work.
According to this criticism the elements of reality I defined are “rubbish – they have nothing to do with
anything”.
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inside box B” to be “highly peculiar and counterintuitive”. This is indeed so, especially
because there is no element of reality “the particle is inside box A and inside box B”, as
it explained above. This peculiar situation is an example of the failure of the “product
rule” for pre- and post-selected elements of reality [6]. From A = a and B = b does not
follow AB = ab. The element of reality “the particle is inside box A and inside box B
corresponds to the definite value of the product of projection operators: PA PB = 1. But
in the three-box example PA PB = 0, in spite of the fact that PA = 1 and PB = 1.
Kastner’s main objection is that the elements of reality “the particle is inside box A”,
and “the particle is inside box B” cannot be interpreted as applying to an individual
system because “being found in box A and being found in box B are mutually exclusive
states of affairs”. She does not take into account that “elements of reality” are just
counterfactual statements. She does not pay attention on the word “instead” in my
writings which she herself quotes in her paper: “If in the intermediate time it was searched
for in box A, it has to be found there with probability one, and if, instead, it was searched
for in box B, it has to be found there too with probability one...”
For demonstration that Kastner’s criticism is unfounded, let me repeat here an ex-
ample of a per-selected only situation [13] in which we attribute “mutually exclusive”
properties to an individual system.
Consider a system of two spin-1
2
particles prepared, at t1, in a singlet state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |↓〉1|↑〉2). (9)
We can predict with certainty that the results of measurements of spin components of the
two particles fulfill the following two relations:
{σ1x}+ {σ2x} = 0, (10)
{σ1y}+ {σ2y} = 0, (11)
where {σ1x} signifies the result of measurement of the spin x component of the first parti-
cle, etc. The relations (10,11) cannot be tested together: the measurement of σ1x disturbs
the measurement of σ1y and the measurement of σ2x disturbs the measurement of σ2y (not
necessarily in the same way). According to the standard approach to quantum theory we
accept that there are two matters of fact: “the outcomes of the spin x components for
the two particles have opposite values” and “the outcomes of the spin y components for
the two particles have opposite values” in spite of the fact that the statements represent
“mutually exclusive states of affairs”. If the spin x components have been measured at
time t, we know that y components of spin were not measured at time t. Note that if
they were measured at a later time, after the spin x component measurement, then the
outcomes might not fulfill the equation (11). According to Kastner’s line of argumenta-
tion the application of statements (10,11) which I named “generalized elements of reality”
(because they are not just about the values of observables, but about relations between
these values) to a single quantum system should also be rejected. However, physicists
do not reject such statements. There ane innumerable works analyzing counterfactuals
related to incompatible measurements on a single system of correlated spin−1
2
particles.
Similarly, Kastner’s argumentation is not valid for the three-box example.
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4 Quantum counterfactuals
I will try here to clarify my statements which were criticized in Section 4 of Kastner’s
paper [12].
First, the meaning of the quotation from my work “indeterminism is crucial for al-
lowing non-trivial time-symmetric counterfactuals” is just the following. Time-symmetric
counterfactuals are related to time-symmetric background conditions, i.e. the state of the
system is fixed both before and after the time about which the counterfactual statement
is given. In a deterministic theory everything is fixed by conditions at a single time and,
therefore, no novel (non-trivial) features can appear in the time-symmetric approach.
In order to clarify the meaning of my continuation: “Lewis’s and other general philo-
sophical analyses are irrelevant for the issue of counterfactuals in quantum theory” let
me quote Lewis’ “system of weights or priorities” for similarity relation of counterfactual
worlds [14]:
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations
of [physical] law.
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region
throughout which perfect match of particular facts prevails.
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.
(Lewis, p. 47)
This priorities might be helpful in the analysis of the truth value of a widely discussed
counterfactual: “If Nixon had pressed the nuclear war button, the world would be very
different”. The purpose of the priorities is to “resolve the vagueness of counterfactuals”.
In physics context, however, the counterfactuals are not vague. (At least, I hope that
counterfactuals I have defined, are not vague.) The truth value of quantum counterfactuals
can be calculated from the equations of quantum theory. The above priorities cannot help
in deciding the truth value of the counterfactual “the outcomes of the spin y components
measurement at time t for the two particles have opposite values” in the world in which
the two spin-1
2
particles were prepared, at t1 < t, in a singlet state (9) and the spin y
components were measured at time t, instead. Priorities (1) and (3) are not relevant
because violations of physical laws are not considered. The counterfactual worlds are
different from the actual world not because of “miracles”, i.e., violations of physical laws,
but because different measurements on the system are considered. And the question about
how it was decided which measurement to perform, is not under discussion. Priorities (2)
and (4) are not relevant because quantum theory fixes everything. In particular, there
is perfect match before the time of the measurement, t, and, in general, there cannot be
arranged the perfect match after t.
We do not have the freedom of interpretation in the framework of quantum counterfac-
tuals after defining the similarity criteria. For the case of pre-selected counterfactuals it is
simply the identity of quantum description of the system before the measurement and this
is not controversial. For time-symmetrized counterfactuals there is no consensus. I have
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my definition. Its advantage that it yields the standard definition as a particular case for
pre-selected only situation and it allows us to analyze and derive useful results for pre-
and post-selected quantum systems. I am aware of other proposals [15, 16]. Each proposal
should be judged according to consistency and usefulness for the purpose it has been de-
fined. The success or failure of various definitions of similarity criteria of counterfactuals
in exact sciences is not measured by maximizing priorities (1)-(4), but by its effectiveness
in the framework of a particular theory. The priorities (1)-(4) are relevant outside the
framework of exact sciences, where we have no laws which determine unambiguously the
truth values of counterfactual statements.
Contrary to Kastner’s writing I never claimed that Lewis’ theory is not applicable in an
indeterministic universe. On the contrary, I have used Lewis’ framework of possible worlds
for defining counterfactuals in quantum theory. I only claimed that most parts of Lewis’
analysis is irrelevant because counterfactuals in the context of quantum theory are of very
specific form and the majority of aspects discussed in the general philosophical literature
on counterfactuals are not present in the quantum case. To make things even more clear
I will add another quotation from Lewis’ writings [14] with an example of argumentation
for which I cannot find any counterpart in the analysis of quantum counterfactuals:
Jim and Jack quarreled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. We
conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would not help him.
But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He never would ask for help after such a
quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there would have to have been
no quarrel yesterday. In that case Jack would be his usual generous self. So if
Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would help him after all. ...
(Lewis, p. 33)
Kastner continues by criticizing my definition of time-symmetrized counterfactual re-
garding results of a measurement performed on pre- and post-selected quantum system:
If it were that a measurement of an observable A has been performed at
time t, t1 < t < t2, then the probability for A = ai would be equal to pi,
provided that the results of measurements performed on the system at times
t1 and t2 are fixed.
Her criticism [17] regarding “problematicity” of the fixing requirement is answered in
another paper [13]. The latter was also criticized by Kastner [10]. She claims that fixing
the results of measurements at t1 and t2 is “ad hoc gerrymanddering” which relies on
accidental similarity of individual facts”. But these facts are the physical assumptions
in the pre- and post-selected situations for analysis of which the above concept of time-
symmetrized counterfactuals has been introduced. Disregarding these facts is similar to
deciding that there have been no quarrel between Jim and Jack even so the counterfactual
statement starts with “Jim and Jack quarreled yesterday ...”. The definitions in physics
have no ambiguity which might allow such free reading of the text.
In the present paper Kastner criticizes the syntax of the definition, in particular, that
it reflects “a confusion between the non-counterfactual and counterfactual usage of the
ABL rule”. In fact, I feel very unsure about the grammatical correctness of tenses in my
definition. Also, I was not able to find exact philosophical definition according to which
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one can decide if a certain statement is “counterfactual”. However, it seems to me that
the meaning of my definition is unambiguous and the name counterfactual is appropriate
in the context of situations this definition was applied for. For example, in the three-box
example described above, the definition is applied when it is known that in the actual
world the observable A (e.g. PA) has not been measured.
Kastner suggests two possible “usages” of my definition. The difference, apart form
using various tenses (the difference between which is beyond my linguistic understanding)
is that only the second one includes the word “instead”. This word is essential. According
to my understanding it is implicit in every counterfactual statement, but maybe it is
helpful to state it explicitly, modifying the definition to:
If it were that a measurement of an observable A has been performed at
time t, t1 < t < t2, instead of whatever took place at time t in the actual world,
then the probability for A = ai would be equal to pi, provided that the results
of measurements performed on the system at times t1 and t2 are fixed.
I hope this clarifies my definition and makes its meaning unambiguous, even so gram-
matically it might not be perfect. Again, Kastner’s arguments presented in her other
paper [17] that this usage of my definition is “generally incorrect” have been answered
in detail elsewhere [13]. Here I want only to comment on Kastner’s concluding sentence
in which she writes: “[Vaidman’s] definition, as it stands, is grammatically incorrect in a
way that reflects its lack of clarity and rigor with respect to the physically crucial point
concerning which measurement has actually taken place”. According to my definition
of time-symmetrized counterfactuals the measurement performed at time t is not “the
physically crucial point”, on the contrary, it plays no role in calculating the truth value of
the counterfactual statement; I have noted this feature of my definition in the paper [18]
which Kastner criticized. The counterfactual statement is about the counterfactual world
in which at time t some action was performed instead of the measurement which was
performed in the actual world. Thus, the question which measurement has been actually
performed is clearly irrelevant. The result of the measurement in the actual world does
not add any information either, because in the framework of standard quantum theory to
which the time-symmetrized formalism is applied, the results of measurements at t1 and
t2 (which are fixed by definition) yield a complete description of the system at time t.
5 What does it mean: probability of a history?
I want to add a comment about a connection to the consistent histories approach [19]
advocated by Kastner and presented in the Appendix to her paper. Following Cohen
[20], Kastner claims that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is valid only for cases
corresponding to “consistent” histories. Since for my counterfactuals the ABL rule is
valid always, I find this approach to be an unnecessary limitation which prevents to see
interesting results.
In addition, I have to admit that I was never been able to understand the meaning of
a basic concept in the consistent history approach: probability of a history. A particular
history associates set of values of observables in a sequential set of times. If the meaning
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of probability is the probability for this set to be the results of the measurements of these
observables at the appropriate times, then this is a well defined question in the framework
of standard quantum theory. (The corresponding formula is given in the ABL paper [1].)
Apparently, the meaning is something different. Indeed, in the example considered by
Kastner, she uses the following expression:
“What is the probability that the system is in state Ck at time t1, given
that it was preselected in state D and post-selected in state F ?”
What is the meaning of “the system is in state Ck? In this example the system (up to
known unitary transformation) is in state D. This is a standard quantum state evolving
towards the future. In the framework of the TSQT one can also associate with the system
at time t1 the backward evolving state F , and to say that the system is described by the
two-state vector 〈F | |D〉. However, from the text of Kastner’s paper it is obvious that she
considers something different. She writes: “we consider a framework in which the system
has some value Ck associated with an arbitrary observable”. As I mentioned in Section
1, quantum observables do not possess values. Thus, I cannot understand the meaning of
Kastner’s sentence: “... we cannot use the ABL rule to calculate the probability of any
particular value of either A or B at time t1...” because “probability of a value” is not
defined.
In this paper I have clarified the meaning of the concepts from the time-symmetrized
quantum formalism: quantum counterfactuals and elements of reality (which are partic-
ular quantum counterfactuals). I have answered recent criticism of these concepts in this
journal by Kastner [12]. Kastner has claimed that the three-box example is a paradox
arising from an invalid counterfactual usage of the ABL rule. I have argued here that if
one adopts my definition of quantum counterfactuals, the ABL rule is valid. Peculiarities
of this example do not represent a true paradox, but the unusual features of pre- and
post-selected elements of reality, such as the failure of the product rule [6].
Current controversy can be added to the list of examples which led Bell to suggest
abandoning the usage of the word “measurement” in quantum theory [21]. However, I do
not think that abstaining from using problematic concepts is the most fruitful approach.
I believe that physical and philosophical concepts which are vague and ambiguous should
continue be under discussion until the concepts and the structure of the physical the-
ory will be clear. I hope that current discussion brings us closer to constructing solid
foundations for quantum theory.
This research was supported in part by grant 471/98 of the Basic Research Foundation
(administered by the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities).
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